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THE EFFECT OF FIRM-SPECIFIC FACTORS ON THE MARKET REACTION 
TO DIVIDEND CHANGE ANNOUNCEMENTS: NEW EVIDENCE FROM 
EUROPE 
 
ABSTRACT 
The dividend policy is one of the most debated topics in the finance literature. 
According to the dividend signalling hypothesis, which has motivated a significant 
amount of theoretical and empirical research, dividend change announcements trigger 
share returns because they convey information about management’s assessment on 
firms’ future prospects. Consequently, a dividend increase (decrease) should be 
followed by an improvement (reduction) in a firm’s value.  
However, some studies have not supported the hypothesis of a positive relationship 
between dividend change announcements, and the subsequent share price reaction, such 
as the ones of Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997), 
Chen, Firth and Gao (2002), Abeyratna and Power (2002) and Vieira (2005). 
Furthermore, some authors found evidence of a significant percentage of cases where 
share prices reactions are opposite to the dividend changes direction, like the works of 
Asquith and Mullins (1983), Benesh, Keown and Pinkerton (1984), Born, Mozer and 
Officer (1988), Dhillon and Johnson (1994) Healy, Hathorn and Kirch (1997), and, 
more recently, Vieira (2005).  
Consequently, we try to identify firm-specific factors that contribute in explaining the 
adverse market reaction to dividend change announcements. Globally, our evidence 
suggests that only for the UK sample we have firm-specific factors influencing the 
market reaction to dividend change announcements. We conclude that the UK firms 
with a negative market reaction to dividend increase announcements have, on average, 
higher size, lower earnings growth rate and lower debt to equity ratios.  
 
Key Words: Cash Dividends, Signalling Hypothesis, Firm-Specific Factors 
JEL Classification: G35, G32  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important assumptions of the signalling hypothesis is that dividend 
change announcements are positively correlated with share price reactions and future 
changes in earnings.  
There have been a significant number of empirical tests showing that dividend change 
announcements are positively associated with share returns in the days surrounding the 
dividend change announcement. Pettit (1972, 1976) found strong support that dividend 
change announcements convey information to the market. Similar results were obtained 
by several authors, such as by Aharony and Swary (1980), Benesh, Keown and 
Pinkerton (1984) and Dhillon and Johnson (1994) for dividend change announcements, 
Asquith and Mullins (1983) for dividend initiations, Lee and Ryan (2000, 2002) for 
dividend initiations and omissions and Lippert, Nixon and Pilotte (2000) for dividend 
increase announcements. Although all these studies were carried out on the American 
market, Travlos, Trigeorgis and Vafaes (2001) analysed the market of Cyprus, Gurgul, 
Madjosz and Mestel (2003), the Austrian market, and Yilmaz and Gulay (2006), the 
Turkey market, finding also support for the dividend information content hypothesis. 
Although there are empirical evidence supporting the positive relationship between 
dividend change announcements and the subsequent share price reactions, some studies 
have not supported this idea. Studies done by Lang and Litzenberger (1989) and 
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) for the American market, Conroy, Eades and 
Harris (2000) for the Japanese market, Chen, Firth and Gao (2002) for the Chinese 
market and Abeyratna and Power (2002), for the United Kingdom, Vieira (2005), for 
two of the three markets analysed (Portugal and France) and Hossain, Siddiquee and 
Rahman (2006) for the Bangladesh market find no evidence of a significant relationship 
between dividend announcements and share returns. 
Furthermore, several studies found evidence of a significant percentage of cases where 
share prices reactions are opposite to the dividend changes direction, like the works of 
Asquith and Mullins (1983), Benesh, Keown and Pinkerton (1984), Born, Mozer and 
Officer (1988), Dhillon and Johnson (1994) Healy, Hathorn and Kirch (1997), and, 
more recently, Vieira (2005).  
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In this context, we will try to analyse whether market reaction to dividend change 
announcements is associated with firm-specific factors. To do so, we will relate the firm 
specific factors to the market share price reaction around the dividend change 
announcements date to evaluate whether the firm-specific factors can influence the 
market reaction in the dividend announcement period. 
Several authors have documented a relationship between market share price reaction to 
dividend change announcements and firm-specific factors, such as Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988), Eddy and Seifert (1988), Haw and Kim (1991), 
Mitra and Owers (1995) and Healy, Hathorn and Kirch (1997). 
Asquith and Mullins (1983) found that market reaction to dividend announcements 
depends on the magnitude of the dividend payment. Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) 
concluded that, for firms that omit or cut dividends, the most significant firm specific 
factors that influence this relationship are the percentage change in dividend, the firms’ 
size, the share performance before the announcement date and the negative information 
released before the dividend change. Eddy and Seifert (1988) and Haw and Kim (1991) 
found a negative relation between firm size and abnormal returns for firms that increase 
dividends and Mitra and Owers (1995) found a similar relation for firms that initiate 
dividends. These results are consistent with Miller and Rock’s (1985) position that the 
dividend announcement effect varies across firms with different degrees of information 
asymmetry. Healy, Hathorn and Kirch (1997) results suggested that firms whose capital 
market have reacted negatively to an initial dividend announcement documents lower 
dividend yield ratio and PER than firms whose reaction was positive and higher 
debt/equity ratio, current ratio and growth earnings before the announcement period. 
Globally, our evidence suggests that only for the UK sample we have firm-specific 
factors influencing the market reaction to dividend change announcements. We 
conclude that the UK firms with a negative market reaction to dividend increase 
announcements have, on average, higher size, lower earnings growth rate and lower 
debt to equity ratios.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the hypothesis. 
The sample selection and empirical methodology are described in Section 3. Section 4 
discusses the empirical results and section 5 provides the conclusion. 
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2. HYPOTHESIS 
We formulate a hypothesis with the purpose of analysing if there are firm-specific 
factors that influence the market reaction around dividend change announcements. This 
prediction can be tested by the following alternative hypothesis:  
H1: “Firm-specific factors affect the market reaction around the dividend 
change announcements date”  
If we find firm-specific variables significantly associated with price changes in the 
dividend announcement period, such as firm size, firm growth and financial leverage, 
we will have evidence of firm-specific factors influencing the market reaction to 
dividend announcements, and, potentially, find some reasons for a negative relationship 
between dividends and share price movements in the announcement period.  
3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY  
In this section, we will identify which data we must collect as well as the methodology 
to be used in order to test the formulated hypotheses. 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
We based this study in the sample of a previous study done recently [Vieira (2005)]. 
Our purpose is to continue to analyse the three European markets considered in previous 
studies, so we continue to explore the UK, the French and the Portuguese markets. The 
sample is drawn from dividend change announcements of firms listed on the Euronext 
Lisbon (EL), Euronext Paris (EP) and London Stock Exchange (LSE). We obtain the 
data on Bloomberg and Datastream databases and, in addition, for the Portuguese 
sample, the Dhatis database. 
Table 1 reports the number of dividend change announcement events (dividend 
increases and dividend decreases) for the three samples. The Portuguese sample 
contains 279 events: 158 increases and 121 decreases. The French sample has 297 
events: 235 increases and 62 decreases and finally, the UK sample consist of 2,889 
events: 2,623 increases and 266 decreases.  
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The preponderance of dividend increases over decreases in the three samples is 
consistent with prior results that firms are reluctant to cut dividends. However, we 
would like to emphasise, for the Portuguese sample, the significant number of dividend 
decreases (about 43% of sample events), when compared with the French and, specially, 
with the UK sample, as well as the major number of empirical works in this domain. 
Portuguese percentages are similar to the ones of some emergent markets, such as 
Thailand and Korea [Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003b)] and the French and the UK 
percentage of dividend changes, especially the case of the UK sample, are similar to the 
ones of Abeyratna and Power (2002)1.  
The UK firms usually announce both dividends and earnings simultaneously. Therefore, 
the UK sample is divided into six categories, according to the scheme presented below: 
 Dividends  Announcement Type Increases No-changes Decreases 
Increases DIEI DNCEI DDEI Earnings Decreases DIED DNCED DDED 
Type of events for the UK, according the relation between dividends and earnings  
 
Thus, there are the following events: dividend increase-earnings increase (DIEI), 
dividend increase-earnings decrease (DIED), dividend no-change-earnings increase 
(DNCEI), dividend no-change-earnings decrease (DNCED), dividend decrease-earnings 
increase (DDEI), and dividend decrease-earnings decrease (DDED).  
METHODOLOGY  
Our samples are an unbalanced panel data. Employing the panel data methodology, we 
use the three common techniques for estimating models with panel data, which are the 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), the fixed effects model (FEM), and the random 
effects model (REM).  Subsequently, we will use an F-statistic and the Hausman (1978) 
test to choose the most appropriate model for our samples. We present the standard 
errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and covariance, based on the White’s (1980) 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors method. 
The hypothesis formulated in the previous section is associated with the analysis of 
firm-specific factors that can affect the market share price reaction surrounding 
                                                 
1 One possible explanation for these sample statistics may be the exposure of emerging and Portuguese 
markets to more economic risks. 
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dividend change announcements. The dividend information content hypothesis states 
that through dividend change announcements investors receive a signal concerning 
management’s assessment of the firm’s future prosperity. The intensity of the market 
reaction to any dividend announcement depends on the amount of new information, it 
contains for the investor. 
Several authors through the years have documented the relationship between the 
valuation effect of dividend changes and firm-specific variables, such as Asquith and 
Mullins (1983), Eddy and Seifert (1988), Haw and Kim (1991), Mitra and Owers (1995) 
and Hathorn and Kirch (1997). Some authors found a negative relationship between 
firm size and abnormal returns around the dividend announcement date [Eddy and 
Seifert (1988), Haw and Kim (1991) and Mitra and Owers (1995), among others]. 
Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) concluded that the most significant factors are the 
percentage change of dividends, the firm’s size and the share performance before the 
announcement date. In addition, Healy, Hathorn and Kirch (1997) suggest that a firm’s 
dividend yield, PER, debt/equity ratio and current ratio have an effect on the probability 
that the capital market will react negatively to an initial dividend announcement, which 
can be important to explain the inverse relation between dividend change 
announcements and the market reaction. 
In selecting the specific factors to study, we were guided by information-oriented 
variables which include proxies to measure the information content of dividend change 
announcements, trying to identify the factors that contribute significantly to the market 
reaction to dividend announcements. The factors are the firm size, the percentage 
change in dividends, the earnings growth, the market to book ratio, the price/earnings 
ratio and the debt/equity ratio. 
We regard as the “buy-and-hold” abnormal return (BHAR) to measure the market 
reaction to dividend change announcements. The BHAR for share i from time a to b 
[BHARi (a to b)]  takes the following form: 
∏∏
==
+−+=
b
at
tm
b
at
tibtoai RRBHAR )1()1( ,,)  (                       [1] 
The time period a to b constitutes three trading days from t = -1, 0 +1. 
We start by testing the relation between the market reaction to a dividend change 
announcement (in the event period) and the firm specific factors that we suppose can 
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influence this relation, estimating the following regression, based on Ghosh and 
Woolridge (1988): 
tiiiiiiii DEPERMBEGPCDFSBHAR ,6543211  to1,     εββββββα +++++++=+−         [2] 
where: 
FSi = firm size for share i, computed as the natural log of market value of 
common equity at the end of the year before the dividend change year;
PCDi = percentage change of dividends for share i, computed as the annual 
change in dividends divided by the share price in the announcement 
day; 
EGi = earnings growth rate for share i, computed as the average earnings 
growth rate based on the year prior to the dividend change year; 
MBi = market to book ratio for share i, calculated by dividing the market 
price per share at the dividend change announcement date by the book 
value per share at the end of the year before the dividend change year; 
PERi = price earning ratio for share i, computed as the price per share at the 
announcement date divided by the earnings per share at the end of the 
year before the dividend change year; 
DEi = debt/equity ratio for share i, calculated as the book value of total debt 
divided by the total book value of equity at the end of the year prior to 
the dividend change announcement. 
 
Interpretation of the signs of some variables will differ depending on the dividend 
changes direction. To overcome the problem of interpreting the coefficient signal 
depending on the direction of dividend changes, and consistent with Haw and Kim 
(1991), we consider the absolute term of such variables. All financial variables are 
measured at the end of the firm’s fiscal year immediately prior to the dividend 
announcement.  
The independent variables are explained bellow: 
Firm Size (FS) 
Firm size is associated with information asymmetry, since less information is available 
to the market about smaller firms, which attract less institutional interest and, as a result, 
are subject to less scrutiny by financial analysts. In addition, they receive less coverage 
in the financial press. To the extent that informational asymmetry is greater for small 
firms than for large firms [Haw and Kim (1991)], the information content of dividend 
announcements will be greater for small firms. Smaller firms have less information 
available in the market, so, when they announce dividend changes, it generates greater 
market surprises that induce a larger reaction by the market. Therefore, we expect this 
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coefficient to have a negative signal. We use market capitalization as a surrogate for 
firm size. FS is defined as the natural log2 of market value of common equity at the end 
of the year before the dividend change year. 
Percentage Change in Dividends (PCD) 
Following Asquith and Mullins (1983), we consider the percentage change of dividends 
as a proxy for the information content of dividend changes. PCD is defined as the 
change in dividends divided by the share price in the announcement day. To overcome 
the problem of interpreting the coefficient signal depending on the direction of dividend 
changes, and consistent with Haw and Kim (1991) approach, we will consider the 
absolute term of this variable. Assuming that a bigger change reveals more information, 
the coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive. 
Earnings Growth (EG) 
Prior earnings are examined to test whether their growth magnitude is a predictor of the 
market reaction to dividend change announcements. EG is computed as the average 
earnings growth rate based on the year prior to the dividend change year3. For the same 
reasons pointed out in the last factor, we will consider the absolute term of this variable. 
It is expected a positive relation between earnings growth and the market reaction to 
dividend change announcements. 
Market to Book Ratio (MB) 
For a proxy to Tobin’s Q, we consider the market to book ratio as an indication of 
investors’ expectation of a firm’s growth prospects or investment opportunities, and 
thus as a proxy for firm maturity and for firms’ growth opportunities. MB is calculated 
by dividing the market price per share at the dividend change announcement date by the 
book value per share at the end of the year before the dividend change year. A high ratio 
value means that a firm has strong growth prospects. Firms with fewer investment 
opportunities will have more free cash flows and so can pay higher dividends. The 
                                                 
2 We use the logarithm of market value because it would better conform to the characteristics of 
symmetry and normality. 
3 Special care will be taken when calculating percentage changes involving a negative value of earnings 
to ensure that any change in sign did not give a false picture of any deterioration or improvement in 
earnings. 
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market reaction to a dividend increase must be higher for firms with fewer investment 
opportunities, so the coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative. 
Price/Earnings Ratio (PER) 
PER is computed as the price per share divided by the earnings per share. A high PER 
may result from high price or low earnings. Thus, it may mean that investors believe the 
firm has growth opportunities and/or its earnings and cash flows are relatively safe. For 
firms that increase their dividends, it may also signal that they have less growth 
prospects than expected and thus dividend increases may be a negative signal, causing 
the market to review its perceptions downward. Therefore, we cannot determine, a 
priori, the direction of the relation between this ratio and the market reaction to dividend 
change announcements. 
Debt/Equity Ratio (DE) 
Debt to equity ratio is used as a proxy for firms’ financial risk. DE is computed as the 
book value of total debt (book value of total long term and short term debt) divided by 
the total book value of equity at the end of the year prior to the dividend change 
announcement. Assuming the reluctance of managers to decrease dividends [Lintner 
(1956)], the higher the financial risk, the lower the probability that a firm increase 
dividends if managers are unsure about their capacity to continue paying dividends. 
Therefore, the market will react strongly to a dividend change announcement for firms 
with higher DE ratios. As a result, we expect this coefficient to have a positive signal.  
Schematically, we present below the variables, abbreviations and the expected signs of 
the regression coefficients: 
Variables Abbreviations Expected sign 
Firm Size FS - 
Percentage Change in Dividends (absolute terms) PCD + 
Earnings Growth (absolute terms) EG + 
Market to Book Ratio MB - 
Price/Earnings Ratio PER ? 
Debt/Equity Ratio DE + 
Independent variables, abbreviations, and the expected signal of the regression coefficients 
 
To see if the proxies are highly correlated and, in effect, proxying for one another, we 
will analyse the correlation between the independent variables. 
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Following, we wish to look at the contribution of the firm specific variables in 
explaining the market reaction to dividend change announcements, but identifying the 
different types of events, looking separately for dividend increase announcements and 
dividend decrease announcements. 
For the Portuguese and the French samples, the regression can be expressed as: 
tiiBiAiB
iAiBiA
iBiAiB
iAiBiAi
DEDEPER
PERMBMB
EGEGPCD
PCDFSFSBHAR
,665
544
332
2111  to1,
 x DD  x DI  x DD                         
 x DI    x DD   x DI                          
   xDD    xDI     x DD                         
   x DI  x DD   x DI 
εβββ
βββ
βββ
βββα
++++
++++
++++
++++=+−
        [3a] 
For the UK market we need to consider more dummy variables in order to identify the 
relation between dividend and earnings announcements. Thus, we will have a total of 
twenty four explanatory variables, i.e., six independent variables times four. The 
regression can be expressed in the following manner: 
tiiii
iiii
DEPERMB
EGPCDFSBHAR
,654
3211  to1,
 x   x   x                           
   x    x   x  
εβββ
βββα
+Φ+Φ+Φ+
+Φ+Φ+Φ+=+−
         [3b] 
where Φ is the vector of coefficients for the dummy variables relating the dividend and 
earnings changes, set equal to 1 respectively, if (a) both dividend and earnings 
increases; (b) dividend increases and earnings decreases; (c) dividend decreases and 
earnings increases; (d) both dividend and earnings decreases, and 0 otherwise. 
Afterwards, we will run a logistic regression to analyse the relation between the 
probability of a negative (positive) market reaction to dividend increase (decrease) 
announcements and the firm-specific characteristics.  
For the dividend increase events, we express the regression as: 
tiiiii LDELPERLMBFSBHARI εββββββα +++++++=+− 654i3i211  to1, LEG  LPCD       [4a] 
where: 
BHARIi,-1 to +1 = dummy variable that takes value 1 if BHARi,-1to+1 is 
negative and 0 otherwise; 
LPCD = natural logarithm of (PCD+1); 
LEG = natural logarithm of (EG+1); 
LMB = natural logarithm of (MB+1); 
LPER = natural logarithm of (PER+1); 
LDE = natural logarithm of (DE+1). 
 
For the dividend decrease events, we express the regression in the subsequent manner: 
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tiiiii LDELPERLMBFSBHARD εββββββα +++++++=+− 654i3i211  to1, LEG  LPCD        [4b] 
where BHARDi,-1 to +1 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if BHARi,-1to+1 is positive 
and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, we will analyse the firm characteristics according to the market reaction to 
dividend change announcements. Thus, we will consider the sub-samples defined 
previously. Specifically, we wish to study whether specific factors can be distinguished 
between the dividend increase events with a positive market reaction (PRDI) and a 
negative market reaction (NRDI) and between the dividend decrease events with a 
negative market reaction (NRDD) and a positive reaction (PRDD).  
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
To evaluate whether firm-specific factors affect the market reaction in the dividend 
announcement period, we test the relationship between the BHAR-1 to +1 and the firm-
specific variables, estimating the regression [2]. Results are shown in Table 2.  
We start by estimating the Pearson correlations among the independent variables. Panel 
A of Table 2 presents the correlation matrix among the exogenous variables along with 
the statistical significance. We are expecting higher values for the correlation between 
MB ratio and PER. Indeed, for both the Portuguese and French samples, the higher 
correlation coefficient is between the PER and the market to book ratio, but still below 
50% in the former sample and below 40% in the latter. Consequently, we can conclude 
that these two variables are not proxying for one another. In the UK sample, the highest 
correlation coefficient is between the market to book ratio and the debt to equity ratio, 
exhibiting a value of 40.2%. In general, although we have some significant correlations, 
the coefficients are not very high (always bellow 50%), so it does not appear to be 
sufficiently large to cause concern about multicollinearity problems.  
The pooled OLS, the FEM and the REM estimation results of regression [2] for all the 
dividend change events (dividend increases and decreases) are reported in Panel B. The 
best model is chosen according to the F statistic and the Hausman test, and is presented 
in bold. For all the three samples the best model is the REM.  
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Portuguese results show that, with the exception of the coefficient for the firm size, all 
the other sample coefficients present the expected signal. However, all of them are 
statistically insignificant. Consequently, we find no variables showing statistical 
significance in explaining the cumulative abnormal returns on the dividend 
announcement period. 
Regarding the French sample, and looking for the REM results, we can see that all the 
variables have the predicted sign except for the firm size and the earnings growth rate. 
However, they are both statistically insignificant. Only one firm specific factor 
contributes in explaining the market reaction to dividend changes, which is the DE ratio. 
However, it is only statistically significant at the 10% level.  
In contrast with prior studies [Haw and Kim (1991), Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) and 
Mitra and Owers (1995)], we did not find a significant relationship between firm size 
and the cumulative abnormal returns for both the Portuguese and the French markets. 
This can probably be explained by the similar size of Portuguese and French firms that 
constitute the sample.  
Finally, the UK results exhibit for all the coefficients the predicted sign except for the 
MB ratio, but its value is not statistically different from zero. Two out of the six 
independent variables contribute in explaining the market return in the 3 days 
surrounding the dividend change announcements. The significant variables are the EG 
rate and the PER. This last coefficient, whose signal we could not predict in advance, is 
negative, implying that higher PER values are associated with a smaller market reaction 
do dividend changes. The EG rate appears to be the most powerful explanatory variable 
between the two. It suggests that investors have different expectations as to dividend 
announcements depending on a firm’s prior history of earnings growth [Healy, Hathorn 
and Kirch (1997)]. 
Our global results show that, considering all the dividend change events, the only 
market where we have firm specific variables with power to explain the market 
abnormal returns in the announcement period is the UK. The explanatory variables that 
contribute in explaining the BHAR in the 3 days surrounding the dividend change 
announcements are the EG and the PER. The reason behind failing to document the 
predicted sign in some coefficients could be an indication that it is associated with the 
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opposite relation between dividend change announcements and the subsequent market 
reaction, found by Vieira (2005), with the same samples. 
Afterwards, we are interested in exploring the power of these variables in explaining the 
market reaction to the different dividend change events. Hence, we include dummy 
variables in the preceding regression to identify dividend increases and decreases. 
The pooled OLS, the FEM and the REM estimation results obtained when we run the 
regression [3] to determine the contribution of the firm specific variables in explaining 
the market reaction to dividend change announcements, with dummies to identify the 
different types of events, are reported in Table 3. The best model is chosen according to 
the F statistic and the Hausman test. Once again, the best model for all the samples is 
the REM. 
Looking for the Portuguese REM results, we can see that the coefficient on market to 
book value is positive for the dividend increase events, contrary to the expected sign, 
and negative for the dividend decrease events, which could suggest a possible reason for 
dividend increase events associated with a negative market reaction. However, those 
coefficients, like all the others, are statistically insignificant. Consequently, we conclude 
that, for the Portuguese sample, none of the firm specific variables contribute to explain 
the market reaction in each of the two distinct groups of events.  
Regarding the French sample, the results show that, although some explanatory 
variables have different signs for the dividend increase and dividend decrease events, 
none of the coefficients are statistically different from zero. For the French market, we 
conclude, like in the Portuguese sample, that none of the firm specific variables 
contribute to explaining the market reaction in each of the two distinct groups of events.  
The UK results show that the coefficients on the DE ratio have different signs in the 
different groups of events. However, none of those coefficients is statistically 
significant. Six out of the twenty four explanatory coefficients are statistically 
significant. The variables that contribute to explain the dependent variable are the PCD 
for the DIEI events, the earnings growth for the DIEI, DIED and DDED events, the MB 
ratio for the DIED events and finally, the PER for the DIED events. However, the MB 
ratio does not have the predicted sign.  
Regarding the percentage change of dividends, the result suggests that the higher the 
dividend increases, when the earnings also increase, the higher the market reaction. This 
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evidence appears to be consistent with the dividend signalling hypothesis and is in 
agreement with the results of Eddy and Seifert (1992). The fact that this coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant for the DIEI events, and negative for the DIED 
events, although not statistically significant, suggests evidence of our previous 
conclusion that earnings announcements convey information beyond what is revealed 
by dividend change announcements.  
All the significant coefficients on earnings growth rate are positive, according to the 
expected sign. Earnings growth effects are less significant in the dividend decreases 
case than in the dividend increases case.  
Contrary to the expected sign, the coefficient on MB is positive for the dividend 
increases, but only statistically significant for the DIED events. It suggests that 
investors do not interpret this relation according to the assumptions of the free cash flow 
hypothesis [Jensen (1986)]; otherwise the coefficient will be negative. On the other 
side, this could be an indication that dividend increases that are preceded by high MB 
ratios convey good future prospects, and so, the market reacts positively, suggesting 
some evidence of the dividends signalling hypothesis. Because of the independency 
between firms and shareholders, the investors can privilege the dividend increase 
announcements over other type of information, such as the MB ratio. In fact, on this 
market we find some evidence, although weak, of the dividend information content 
hypothesis. 
Finally, the coefficient on PER, for which we have not predicted, a priori, a specific 
sign, is negative. This result suggests that, when a dividend increase is preceded by a 
high PER, investors might interpret it as an indication that firms have less growth 
prospects than expected, and reacts accordingly, revising its perceptions downward. 
Our results considering the dividend increase and dividend decrease events separately 
are quite similar to the ones obtained without distinguishing the two types of events. The 
only market where we have firm specific variables with power to explain the market 
abnormal returns in the announcement period is the UK. The explanatory variables that 
contribute in explaining the BHAR in the 3 days surrounding the dividend change 
announcements are the earnings growth, and, only for dividend increase events, the 
percentage change of dividends, the MB ratio and the PER. The reason behind the 
evidence of some different signs for the distinct types of events (dividend increases and 
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decreases) on the same firm-specific variable could be an indication that it is associated 
with the opposite relation between dividend change announcements and the subsequent 
market reaction. 
Robustness 
To evaluate the robustness of the results, we repeated the analysis using alternative 
explanatory variables, reflecting other firm-specific factors4. 
Fist, we include an additional liquidity variable that measures the adequacy of a firm’s 
cash resources to meet its near-term cash obligations, the working capital ratio (WCR), 
computed as total current assets divided by total current liabilities at the end of year 
before the announcement period. Running the several regressions, the results show that 
the coefficient on WCR is always statistically insignificant, not contributing in 
explaining the market reaction surrounding dividend change announcements.  
In addition, we include a variable to measure the financial constraints. A commonly 
used index to measure financial constraints is the KZ index, as it was denominated by 
Lamont et al. (2001). The index constructed by these authors uses the coefficients of the 
regression of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) work. As this index is composed by five 
variables and we have already used some of them in the regression [2], we will adopt 
the cash flow to assets5 measure (CF) as a proxy for the financial constraints, which is 
also popular in the empirical tests done in this domain, computed as operating income 
before depreciation minus interest expense, income taxes and preferred stock dividends 
scaled by the total assets at the end of the year before the dividend announcement, as 
previously defined. The results show that the coefficient on CF is statistically 
insignificant for all the three countries, not contributing in explaining the market 
reaction surrounding dividend change announcements6.  
As these two variables do not change our conclusions, we decide to not consider these 
additional firm-specific variables in the following analysis. 
                                                 
4 For simplicity reasons, the results are not reported in the study, but available from authors upon request. 
5 The other four variables of the KZ index are: the market to book ratio, debt to total capital, dividends to 
total capital and cash holdings to capital.  
6 Globally, the increases in the adjusted R2 when we introduce the CF variable are worthless.  
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The next step consists of analysing the relation between the probability of a negative 
(positive) market reaction to dividend increase (decrease) announcements and the firm-
specific characteristics.  
Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression [4] for dividend increase events 
(Panel A) and for dividend decrease events (Panel B).   
Panel A presents the regression results of the relation between the probability of a 
negative market reaction to dividend increase announcements and firm specific 
characteristics. The factors that, in global terns, contribute to a negative market reaction 
are the FS, the EG, the MB ratio and the DE ratio. 
The results of the Portuguese sample exhibit two coefficients statistically significant and 
negative, which are the logarithm of earnings growth (LEG) and the logarithm of debt 
to equity ratio (LDE). The French results present one negative and marginally 
significant coefficient, at the 10% level, which is the logarithm of market to book ratio 
(LMB). The UK sample presents three out of the six variables as statistically significant. 
The LDE is negative and the firm size (FS) and the LMB are positive. This last one was 
negative in the French sample. 
The evidence that in the UK the coefficient on FS is positive and statistically significant 
suggests that firms with higher size have a higher probability of a negative market 
reaction. One possible reason might be the fact that the information asymmetry is 
smaller for bigger firms, as they have more information available in the market and are 
subject to more scrutiny by financial analysts. Consequently, the investors of bigger 
firms have more information, beyond that of dividend changes, to assess and thus, to 
react. This result appears to be consistent with the evidence obtained by Haw and Kim 
(1991), Eddy and Seifert (1992) and Mitra and Owners (1995). 
The fact that the coefficient on earnings growth rate is negative suggests that the higher 
the earnings growth, the less the probability that the market will react negatively to a 
dividend increase announcement. Since earnings growth are a primary source of 
information regarding future dividends [Lintner (1956) and Vieira (2005), among other 
authors], it is possible that the prior earnings growth may be a predictor of the market 
reaction at the announcement period. 
The LMB ratio is negative and significant in France, which is a signal that the higher 
the MB ratio, the less the probability that the market reacts negatively to dividend 
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increases. In the UK market, the opposite happens. The coefficient is positive and 
significant, suggesting that a high MB ratio increases the likelihood that the market 
reacts negatively to dividend increases. The different reaction in the two countries might 
be related to the way shareholders interpret the information, and to the firm 
characteristics. The result of UK sample suggests that the market has a higher 
probability to react negatively to dividend increases if firms have growth opportunities. 
This seems to be in contrast with the previous results (Table 3) and in accordance with 
the free cash flow hypothesis. The French result suggests that the market reacts mainly 
and positively to dividend increases. This could imply that investors believe that high 
MB firms that increase dividends are signalling continuing growth opportunities, which 
is in accordance with the dividend signalling hypothesis. Another possible reason for 
that to happen can be associated with the firm’s stage. Perhaps French firms are, 
generally, in the maturity stage and MB is high, not because of a high market value of 
equity, but because of an obsolete book value.    
LDE is negative and significant in two out of the three countries (Portugal and the UK), 
suggesting that a high debt to equity ratio decreases the likelihood that the market reacts 
negatively to a dividend increase announcement. This evidence does not suggest that 
markets react negatively when firm’s debt is high because of the greater risk of 
covenant, like the results of Healy, Hathorn and Kirch (1997), but instead suggests, 
according the opinion of Ross (1977), that good quality firms are able to differentiate 
themselves from lesser quality firms by assuming a higher leverage ratio. Investors can 
interpret this as a signal that managers are sure about their capacity to continue paying 
dividends. This evidence can be an indication that leverage and dividends are 
complementary signalling mechanisms. 
In sum, firms with negative market reactions to dividend increase announcements have, 
on average, higher size, lower earnings growth rate and lower debt to equity ratios. 
These results suggest that, for bigger firms under low earnings growth rate and low DE 
ratio, the market interprets a dividend increase as a negative signal.     
Panel B presents the regression results of the relation between the probability of a 
positive market reaction to dividend decrease announcements and firm specific 
characteristics. The only factor that contributes significantly to a positive market 
reaction is the PER, and only for the French market. It is negative and statistically 
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significant at the 5% level. The Portuguese and the UK samples exhibit no coefficients 
statistically significant.  
The fact that PER is negative means that it contributes to a lower probability that the 
market reacts positively to a dividend decrease. This could imply that investors believe 
that high PER firms that decrease dividends are conveying to the market information 
that they have less growth prospects than expected. 
Summarising, firms with positive market reactions to dividend decrease announcements 
tend to have, on average, lower PER, but only for the case of the French market. This 
suggests that under a low PER, the French market interprets a dividend decrease as a 
positive signal. For the other two samples, our results do not find support for a 
relationship between firm specific characteristics and the probability of a positive 
market reaction to dividend decrease announcements. 
Finally, we wish to analyse the differences in firm characteristics between the distinct 
market reaction (positive or negative) to dividend increase and dividend decrease 
announcements in order to see if there are any systematic differences between events 
with a positive and a negative market reaction for each of the two types of events.  
Table 5 presents the mean values for the selected specific factors and the t-statistic test 
for the differences between the means of the two groups (PRDI versus NRDI and 
NRDD versus PRDD events).    
Looking for the mean differences between the dividend increase events with a positive 
market reaction and those with a negative reaction, we can see that there are significant 
differences between the means of the firm size for the UK, the means of the percentage 
change of dividends for the UK, the means of earnings growth for Portugal and the UK, 
the means of MB ratio for the French and the UK markets, the means of the PER for the 
UK and, finally, the means of the DE ratio for the Portuguese sample. 
We use firm size as a proxy for the information asymmetry. Consistent with the 
signalling hypothesis, we expect that smaller firms, which are likely to experience 
greater information asymmetry, tend to use dividends to signal firm’s future prospects, 
and that the market consider this information as worthy and reacts positively to dividend 
increases. Therefore, we expect for firms with a direct relation between dividend 
increases and the market reaction having a smaller size than those with an inverse 
relation between the two variables. Thus, consistent with the assumptions of the 
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signalling hypothesis, we expect to have lower values for the first group compared to 
the second one. Indeed, for the UK sample, the only one where the mean difference is 
significant, we have a lower firm size mean value for the first group. Consistent with the 
signalling hypothesis, we find that smaller firms in the UK market, which are likely to 
experience greater information asymmetry, tend to use dividends as a signal 
mechanism. This evidence is consistent with Miller and Rock’s (1985) position that the 
dividend announcement effect varies across firms with different degrees of information 
asymmetry.    
Assuming that a bigger change of dividends reveals more information, we expect to find 
higher mean values for the group with a direct relation between dividend changes and 
market reaction. According to what is expected, we find significant higher mean values 
for the percentage change of dividends in the events characterised by a direct relation 
between dividend increases and the market reaction for the UK sample. Although it also 
happens in the Portuguese sample, the mean difference is not significant. This is an 
indication of the market reaction being a function of how much information is revealed. 
Past earnings growth can be associated with expectations of future earnings growth. 
Thus, assuming dividend increase announcements convey good information about 
future earnings prospects, we expect to have higher earnings growth mean values for the 
first group compared to the second one. As we can see, this happens for all the three 
samples, but the difference is only significant for the Portuguese and the UK samples. 
The market to book ratio can be considered as a proxy for the firms’ growth 
opportunities. A high ratio can be a signal that a firm has strong growth prospects. 
According to the free cash flow assumptions, firms with fewer investment opportunities 
will have more free cash flows and so can pay higher dividends. Hence, we expect to 
have higher mean values for the MB ratio in the NRDI events than in the PRDI events, 
reflecting a negative reaction to earnings distributed that must be retained to finance the 
future growth prospects. In fact, it happens in the UK market. The results are consistent 
with the ones obtained in Table 4 (Panel A), where we conclude that a high MB ratio 
increases the likelihood that the market reacts negatively to dividend increases. On the 
other hand, according to the dividend signalling hypothesis, we can interpret a high MB 
ratio as conveying optimistic information to the market about firm’s future earnings 
prospects as a sequence of growth opportunities and, consequently, firms with a positive 
market reaction to dividend increase announcements will have higher values for the MB 
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ratio. Indeed, this situation happens in the French market. This result is also consistent 
with the evidence of Table 4 (Panel A) for this sample, where we find evidence that the 
higher the MB ratio, the less the probability that the market reacts negatively to 
dividend increases. 
The PER mean value is significantly lower (higher) for the events with a positive 
(negative) market reaction in the UK sample. This result is in accordance with the one 
exhibited in Table 3, suggesting that, when firms announce dividend increases, the 
market interprets a high PER as a signal that firms have less growth opportunities then 
expected, adjusting its perceptions downwards.  
As we have already mentioned, Ross (1977) shows that good quality firms are able to 
differentiate themselves from lesser quality firms by assuming a higher leverage ratio. 
Consequently, we suppose that the events in the first group may be associated with 
higher levels of debt to equity ratio compared to the other events. It happens for all the 
samples, but the mean difference is only statistically significant for the Portuguese case. 
This result suggests, once more, that leverage and dividends are complementary 
signalling mechanisms.       
Afterwards, we analyse the differences between the dividend decrease events with a 
negative market reaction and those with a positive reaction. 
Looking for the mean differences, we can see that there are significant differences 
between the means of the firm size, the percentage change of dividends and the earnings 
growth for the UK, and between the means of earnings growth, of MB ratio and of PER 
for the French sample. For the Portuguese sample, none of the mean differences is 
statistically significant. 
The firm size is smaller for the events with a negative market reaction to dividend 
decreases, as expected. This could be an indication that the market considers the 
information about smaller firms as worthy, because it is scarce, and reacts negatively to 
dividend decreases.   
Regarding the percentage change of dividends, although we have a significant mean 
difference, the mean values for both types of events are similar.  
In what concerns the earnings growth, the results of France and the UK are different. 
We expect that the past earnings growth could have some effect in the market reaction, 
according to their good or bad performance, contributing positively to the market 
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reaction, in the former situation, and negatively in the later. Thus, we expect to find 
higher mean values for the events with a positive market reaction compared to the 
events with a negative reaction. Indeed, in the UK market, the mean earnings growth is 
negative for the events with a negative reaction to dividend decreases and is positive for 
the events with a positive market reaction. Once more, it suggests that earnings are at 
least as informative as dividends, or even more informative. This conclusion was found 
in prior research, such as in the works of Abeyratna and Power (2002) and Francis, 
Schipper and Vincent (2005), for single class shares in the US market. Surprisingly, in 
the French market, the behaviour is opposite, with positive earnings growth in the 
NRDD events and negative earnings growth in the PRDD events. Maybe the French 
investors do not consider the EG rate information to react in the event period. Indeed, 
we find no evidence for EG contributing to explain the market reaction in the dividend 
announcement period (Tables 2 and 3).  
For the French market, the dividend decrease events with a negative market reaction 
present higher mean values for the MB ratio and for the PER. One possible reason for 
these results might be, for both the MB ratio and the PER, the fact that the market 
realises the high values of these ratios as a good new about future growth opportunities 
(associated with the information content perspective, and not with the free cash flow 
hypothesis), do not understanding the reason why, in these circumstances, firms 
decrease dividends, reacting worse in these situations (dividend decreases by firms with 
good prospects about future growth opportunities). Another reason could be the stage of 
the maturity of French firms with high ratios because of the low values of the 
denominators (book value of equity and earnings, respectively). 
Summarising, the results exhibit evidence that, for the dividend increase events, the firm 
size, the market to book ratio and the price/earnings ratio tend to be higher for the 
events with a negative market reaction. The percentage change of dividends, the 
earnings growth and the debt/equity ratio tend to be lower for the events with a negative 
market reaction. These results could be interpreted as an indication that investors 
punish dividend increases when they have a lower magnitude, when the earnings 
growth is lower and when firms have strong growth prospects but increase dividends 
instead of retaining them to finance new projects.      
For the dividend decrease events, the results are not so robust, but suggest that the firm 
size and the earnings growth (with the exception of the French sample) tend to be 
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higher for the events with a positive market reaction and the price/earnings ratio tend 
to be lower in this type of events. This suggests that the market can react positively to 
dividend decreases when past earnings have grown.   
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Analysing the hypothesis that some firm-specific factors contribute to explain the 
cumulative abnormal return, we obtain the main results: 
- When we consider all the dividend changes, the only markets where we have 
firm specific variables with power to explain the market abnormal returns in the 
announcement period are France and the UK. The explanatory variables that 
contribute in explaining the BHAR in the 3 days surrounding the dividend 
change announcements are the DE ratio, in the first market, and the earnings 
growth and the PER in the latter one. Although we find weak evidence of firm-
specific variables influencing the market reaction surrounding the events period, 
the finding that investors have different expectations as to dividend 
announcements depending on a firm’s prior history of earnings growth is 
consistent with the results of Healy, Hathorn and Kirch (1997); 
- When we consider dividend increases and decreases separately the results are 
not very different. The only market where we have firm specific variables with 
power to explain the market abnormal returns in the announcement period is the 
UK. The explanatory variables that contribute in explaining the BHAR in the 
announcement period are the earnings growth, and, only for dividend increase 
events, the percentage change of dividends, the MB ratio and the PER. The 
evidence that the higher the dividend increases, the higher the market reaction 
suggests that the share price adjustment to dividend changes occurs in response 
to the information content of these decisions, which is consistent with the 
dividend signalling hypothesis and in agreement with several prior results, such 
as Eddy and Seifert (1992); 
- The reason behind the evidence of some different signs for the distinct types of 
events (dividend increases and decreases) on the same firm-specific variable 
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could be an indication that it is associated with the opposite relation between 
dividend change announcements and the subsequent market reaction; 
- Globally, for the Portuguese and the French markets our evidence fails to 
support that there are firm-specific factors that contribute in a consistent way to 
explain the abnormal market return. The only country for which we find some 
evidence is the UK; 
- Analysing the relation between the probability of a negative market reaction to 
dividend increase announcements and the firm-specific factors, the results 
suggest that firms with negative market reactions to dividend increase 
announcements have, on average, higher size, lower earnings growth rate and 
lower debt to equity ratios. Globally, these results are consistent with the ones of 
Ross (1977), Haw and Kim (1991), Eddy and Seifert (1992) and Mitra and 
Owners (1995). This evidence suggests that dividend increases of big firms with 
low earnings growth and low levels of debt can be seen as a bad new; 
- Analysing the relation between the probability of a positive market reaction to 
dividend decrease announcements and the firm-specific factors, our results do 
not find support for a significant relationship between these variables, except for 
the French market, which evidence suggests that firms with positive market 
reactions to dividend decreases tend to have, on average, lower PER; 
- The distinct results between the French and the UK samples could be related 
with differences in ownership and governance between the two countries. The 
first one is a bank based system with ownership concentration, where 
asymmetric information and agency problems are solved differently than in the 
latter country, which is a market-based system; 
- When we compare the means differences of the firm-specific variables between 
the events with a positive and a negative market reaction for both the dividend 
increase and dividend decrease events, the findings indicate that, for the 
dividend increase events, the firm size, the market to book ratio and the 
price/earnings ratio tend to be higher for the events with a negative market 
reaction. The percentage change of dividends, the earnings growth and the 
debt/equity ratio tend to be lower for the events with a negative market reaction. 
The finding that firms with a positive reaction to dividend increases tend to have 
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higher DE ratio suggests that firms signalling with dividends may be associated 
with higher levels of debt ratio, which is in accordance with Mougoué and Rao 
(2003). For the dividend decrease events, the results are not so robust, but 
suggest that the firm size and the earnings growth (with the exception of the 
French sample) tend to be higher for the events with a positive market reaction 
and the price/earnings ratio tend to be lower in this type of events; 
- These results are an indication that investors penalise dividend increases when 
they have a lower magnitude, when the earnings growth are lower and when 
firms have a strong growth prospects but increase dividends instead of retain 
them to finance new project and suggests that the market can react positively to 
dividend decreases if the past earnings have grown; 
- The finding indicating that, for the UK sample, earnings change announcements 
convey information beyond what is revealed by dividend change announcements 
is consistent with our previous results as well as with DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (1992), Abeyratna and Power (2002) and Francis, Schipper and Vincent 
(2005) evidence. 
Globally speaking, and having in consideration the evidence obtained so far, the results 
suggest that in the UK, where information asymmetry is higher than in the other two 
countries considered in this study, managers tend to use dividends as a mechanism to 
mitigate it, which is in accordance with Lasfer and Zenonos (2004) evidence. In France 
and in Portugal, countries characterised by a bank-based system, and where information 
asymmetry is lower than in the UK, there is no pronounced need to use dividends to 
convey information to the market, being the signalling effect of dividends less 
important, which results validate the ones of Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003a) and 
Goergen, Renneboog and Silva (2005). Furthermore, this evidence is consistent with the 
axiom that there is a smaller signalling function in the bank-based system.    
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The phenomenon of an inverse relationship between dividend changes and market 
reaction in several studies motivate us for further research, such as the relation between 
firm specific factors and the market reaction in the dividend announcement period. 
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For robustness reasons, we would like to explore different situations. Firstly, we will try 
to consider, in spite of the dividend changes, the dividend forecasts, when computing 
unexpected dividend changes, and the dividend yield ratio, in order to see if the main 
conclusions are unchanged. Secondly, we would like to consider, for the firm size 
variable, the assets value instead of the equity market value of common equity because 
of the different capital structures. Thirdly, we must consider market values in the 
computation of the debt to equity ratio. Finally, we think it is important to consider the 
yearly average of prices when calculating the PER, since the earnings are expressed in a 
yearly basis, and the price is referred to a specific moment.     
Furthermore, we would like to analyse other variables, namely to explore the issue of 
the propriety firms’ control, such as the free float and the firms’ structure of property.  
Finally, we believe that an interesting theme for future research and further 
development of this study would be the examination of country-specific variables, such 
as taxes, the financing system and the concentration of ownership equity with the 
purpose to analyse the different behaviour among the three country samples considered 
in this work.  
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Table 1 - Sample Selection 
This table reports the number of dividend events (dividend increases and dividend decreases) for the 
Portuguese, the French and the UK samples, based on the study of Vieira (2005).  
 
 
 
Portuguese Sample 
  
Dividend 
Increases 
Dividend 
Decreases Total 
Dividend events 158 121 279 
Events Percentage 56,6% 43,4% 100,00% 
French Sample 
Dividend events 235 62 297 
Events Percentage 79,1% 20,9% 100,00% 
UK Sample 
Dividend events 2,623 266 2,889 
Events Percentage 90,8% 9,2% 100,00% 
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Table 2 - Regression of BHAR on firm specific variables and correlation matrix 
This table reports the estimation of a regression relating cumulative abnormal return (BHAR) in the 
announcement period to firm specific variables and the correlations between the independent variables. 
Panel A presents the Pearson correlations between independent variables. FSi is the firm size (natural log 
of market value of common equity at the end of the year before the dividend change year); PCDi is the 
percentage change of dividends (the annual change in dividends divided by the share price in the 
announcement day); EGi is the earnings growth rate (the average earnings growth rate based on the year 
prior to the dividend change year); MBi is the market to book ratio (market price per share at the dividend 
change announcement date divided by the book value per share at the end of the year before the dividend 
change year); PERi is the price earning ratio (the price per share at the announcement date divided by the 
earnings per share at the end of the year before the dividend change year); DEi is the debt to equity ratio 
(the book value of total debt divided by the total book value of equity at the end of the year prior to the 
dividend change announcement). Panel B presents the regression results estimated using pooled OLS, 
FEM and REM. The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity using the 
White (1980) method. It reports the F test, a test for the equality of sets of coefficients, and the Hausman 
(1978) test, a test with H0: random effects are consistent and efficient, versus H1: random effects are 
inconsistent, in order to choose the most appropriate model for each particular sample. 
 
Panel A: Pearson correlations between independent variables (significance in parenthesis) 
Portugal 
 FS PCD EG MB PER DE 
Firm Size (FS) 1.000 -0.047 0.087 0.413* 0.211* 0.051 
  (0.433) (0.145) (0.000) (0.000) (0.397) 
% Change Div. (PCD)  1.000 0.189* -0.031 -0.025 -0.019 
   (0.001) (0.603) (0.675) (0.748) 
Earnings Growth (EG)   1.000 0.026 -0.056 0.001 
    (0.670) (0.350) (0.990) 
Market to Book (MB)    1.000 0.488* 0.141 
     (0.000) (0.018) 
PER     1.000 0.007 
      (0.907) 
Debt/Equity (DE)      1.000 
France 
 FS PCD EG MB PER DE 
Firm Size (FS) 1.000 0.078 0.021 0.370* 0.091 0.127** 
  (0.178) (0.717) (0.000) (0.116) (0.029) 
% Change Div. (PCD)  1.000 0.001 0.020 -0.015 -0.079 
   (0.984) (0.731) (0.799) (0.173) 
Earnings Growth (EG)   1.000 0.086 0.154* 0.033 
    (0.137) (0.008) (0.575) 
Market to Book (MB)    1.000 0.371* -0.216* 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
PER     1.000 -0.060 
      (0.305) 
Debt/Equity (DE)      1.000 
                        (Continue) 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 2 - Regression of BHAR on firm specific variables and correlation matrix 
(continued) 
 
 
Panel A: Pearson correlations between independent variables (significance in parenthesis) 
UK 
 FS PCD EG MB PER DE 
Firm Size (FS) 1.000 0.024 -0.008 0.127* 0.184* 0.115* 
  (0.201) (0.677) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
% Change Div. (PCD)  1.000 0.026 0.034 -0.018 -0.012 
   (0.163) (0.072) (0.340) (0.536) 
Earnings Growth (EG)   1.000 0.001 0.017 -0.045** 
    (0.965) (0.365) (0.015) 
Market to Book (MB)    1.000 0.313* 0.402* 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
PER     1.000 0.023 
      (0.219) 
Debt/Equity (DE)      1.000 
 
 
Panel B: 
tiiiiiiii DEPERMBEGPCDFSBHAR ,6543211  to1,     εββββββα +++++++=+−  
Portugal 
Coefficient Pooled OLS FEM REM  
Constant 0.033 ** 0.019  
 (2.409) (0.649)  
Firm Size -0.001 0.001 0.000  
 (-0.990) (0.392) (0.009)  
% Change of Divid. 0.000 0.004 0.003  
 (0.007) (1.281) (0.539)  
Earnings Growth 0.002 0.002 0.002  
 (1.090) (1.193) (1.375)  
Market to Book ratio 0.002 -0.003 -0.001  
 (0.969) (-0.754) (-0.380)  
Price/Earnings ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.019) (0.482) (0.436)  
Debt to Equity ratio 0.002 0.003 0.003  
 (0.993) (1.218) (1.440)  
N 279 279 279  
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.068 0.318  
Test F 1.30 ***   
Hausman Test  2.20   
(Continue) 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 2 - Regression of BHAR on firm specific variables and correlation matrix 
(continued) 
 
 
Panel B: 
tiiiiiiii DEPERMBEGPCDFSBHAR ,6543211  to1,     εββββββα +++++++=+−  
France 
Coefficient Pooled OLS FEM REM  
Constant 0.041 * 0.019  
 (3.229) (0.872)  
Firm Size -0.001 0.005 0.001  
 (-0.903) (1.590) (0.333)  
% Change of Divid. -0.024 0.216 0.070  
 (-0.247) (1.308) (0.521)  
Earnings Growth -0.001 *** -0.001 -0.001  
 (-1.743) (-0.313) (-0.551)  
Market to Book ratio -0.000 -0.008 ** -0.002  
 (-0.059) (-2.086) (-0.772)  
Price/Earnings ratio -0.001 0.000 -0.000  
 (-0.916) (0.374) (-0.043)  
Debt to Equity ratio 0.004 *** 0.005 0.005 *** 
 (1.658) (1.106) (1.777)  
N 297 297 297  
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.068 0.350  
Test F 1.35 ** 0.096   
Hausman Test  6.51   
UK 
Coefficient Pooled OLS FEM REM  
Constant 0.079 * 0.071 * 
 (7.895) (5.617)  
Firm Size -0.002 * 0.003 *** -0.001  
 (-3.021) (1.691) (-1.566)  
% Change of Divid. 0.196 ** 0.072 0.114  
 (2.375) (0.826) (1.234)  
Earnings Growth 0.007 * 0.006 * 0.006 * 
 (4.613) (3.829) (4.557)  
Market to Book ratio 0.001 ** -0.001 0.001  
 (2.554) (-0.654) (1.140)  
Price/Earnings ratio -0.000 -0.001 * -0.001 ** 
 (-1.387) (-3.212) (-1.981)  
Debt to Equity ratio 0.000 0.007 ** 0.002  
 (0.022) (2.559) (1.089)  
N 2,889 2,889 2,889  
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.079 0.207  
Test F 1.38 *   
Hausman Test  3.47   
 
  
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 3 - Regression of BHAR on firm specific variables with dummies 
This table reports the estimation of a regression relating the BHAR in the event period to firm specific 
factors using dummy variables to identify dividend increase and decrease events. FSi is the firm size, 
computed as the natural log of market value of common equity at the end of the year before the dividend 
change year; PCDi is the percentage change of dividends, computed as the annual change in dividends 
divided by the share price in the announcement day; EGi is the earnings growth rate, computed as the 
average earnings growth rate based on the year prior to the dividend change year; MBi is the market to 
book ratio, calculated by dividing the market price per share at the dividend change announcement date 
by the book value per share at the end of the year before the dividend change year; DEi is the debt to 
equity ratio, calculated as the book value of total debt divided by the total book value of equity at the end 
of the year prior to the dividend change announcement; DI (DD) is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise; Φ is the vector of coefficients for the dummy 
variables relating dividend and earnings changes, set equal to 1 respectively, if both dividend and 
earnings increases, dividend increases and earnings decreases, dividend decreases and earnings increases, 
both dividend and earnings decreases, and 0 otherwise. The regression results are estimated using pooled 
OLS, FEM and REM. The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity 
using the White (1980) method. It reports the F test, a test for the equality of sets of coefficients, and the 
Hausman (1978) test, a test with H0: random effects are consistent and efficient, versus H1: random 
effects are inconsistent, in order to choose the most appropriate model for each particular sample. 
 
 
tiiBiAiB
iAiBiAiBiA
iBiAiBiAi
DEDEPER
PERMBMBEGEG
PCDPCDFSFSBHAR
,665
54433
22111  to1,
 x DD  x DI  x DD 
 x DI    x DD   x DI     xDD    xDI  
    x DD    x DI  x DD   x DI 
εβββ
βββββ
ββββα
++++
++++++
+++++=+−
Portugal 
Coefficient Pooled OLS FEM REM 
Constant 0.034 ** 0.018  
 (2.229) (0.603)  
DI x FS -0.001 0.001 0.000  
 (-0.846) (0.457) (0.031)  
DD x FS -0.001 0.001 0.000  
 (-1.064) (0.530) (0.082)  
DI x PCD -0.000 0.004 0.004  
 (-0.010) (1.278) (0.533)  
DD x PCD -0.003 0.005 0.004  
 (-0.160) (0.234) (0.123)  
DI x EG 0.002 0.002 0.002  
 (0.993) (1.093) (1.322)  
DD x EG 0.001 0.001 0.001  
 (0.213) (0.312) (0.211)  
DI x MB 0.004 -0.000 0.001  
 (0.841) (-0.027) (0.262)  
DD x MB 0.000 -0.006 -0.004  
 (0.378) (-1.373) (-0.826)  
DI x PER -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
 (-0.839) (-0.607) (-0.476)  
DD x PER 0.002 0.000 0.000  
 (1.359) (1.306) (0.947)  
DI x DE 0.002 0.003 0.003  
 (0.803) (1.091) (1.304)  
DD x DE 0.002 0.002 0.002  
 (0.586) (0.408) (0.436)  
N 279 279 279  
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.047 0.309  
Test F 1.28 ***   
Hausman Test  2.41   
(Continue) 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 3 - Regression of BHAR on firm specific variables with dummies (continued) 
 
 
tiiBiAiB
iAiBiAiBiA
iBiAiBiAi
DEDEPER
PERMBMBEGEG
PCDPCDFSFSBHAR
,665
54433
22111  to1,
 x DD  x DI  x DD 
 x DI    x DD   x DI     xDD    xDI  
    x DD    x DI  x DD   x DI 
εβββ
βββββ
ββββα
++++
++++++
+++++=+−  
France 
Coefficient Pooled OLS FEM REM 
Constant 0.038 * 0.016  
 (2.959) (0.710)  
DI x FS -0.001 0.006 *** 0.001  
 (-0.593) (1.915) (0.503)  
DD x FS -0.001 0.007 *** 0.001  
 (-0.526) (1.945) (0.649)  
DI x PCD 0.138 0.448 ** 0.207  
 (0.771) (1.999) (0.988)  
DD x PCD -0.102 0.212 0.027  
 (-1.251) (1.347) (0.192)  
DI x EG -0.001 0.008 0.000  
 (-0.742) (0.589) (0.043)  
DD x EG -0.002 -0.004 -0.003  
 (-1.202) (-1.529) (-0.990)  
DI x MB -0.001 -0.009 ** -0.002  
 (-0.449) (-2.272) (-0.764)  
DD x MB -0.001 -0.011 ** -0.004  
 (-0.427) (-2.557) (-1.015)  
DI x PER 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.020) (0.393) (0.182)  
DD x PER -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  
 (-1.307) (-0.537) (-0.582)  
DI x DE 0.000 0.003 0.002  
 (0.170) (0.517) (0.653)  
DD x DE 0.006 ** 0.004 0.005  
 (1.979) (0.808) (1.561)  
N 297 297 297  
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.081 0.342  
Test F 1.30 ***   
Hausman Test  12.25   
      (Continue) 
 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 3 - Regression of BHAR on firm specific variables with dummies (continued) 
tiiii
iiii
DEPERMB
EGPCDFSBHAR
,654
3211  to1,
 x   x   x                           
   x    x   x  
εβββ
βββα
+Φ+Φ+Φ+
+Φ+Φ+Φ+=+−
 
UK 
Coefficient Pooled OLS FEM REM  
Constant 0.073 * 0.067 * 
 (7.051) (5.396)  
DIEI x FS -0.002 * 0.004 *** -0.001  
 (-2.966) (1.865) (-1.612)  
DIED x FS -0.001 *** 0.004 ** -0.001  
 (-1.716) (1.976) (-0.930)  
DDEI x FS -0.000 0.005 ** 0.000  
 (-0.209) (2.324) (0.154)  
DDED x FS -0.001 0.004 *** -0.001  
 (-1.480) (1.853) (-0.934)  
DIEI x PCD 0.901 * 0.482 0.691 ** 
 (2.624) (1.640) (2.543)  
DIED x PCD 0.190 -0.230 -0.058  
 (0.479) (-0.566) (-0.174)  
DDEI x PCD -0.279 -0.290 -0.290  
 (-1.385) (-1.254) (-1.216)  
DDED x PCD 0.222 ** 0.148 0.172  
 (2.360) (1.501) (1.358)  
DIEI x EG 0.006 * 0.005 ** 0.005 * 
 (2.685) (2.184) (2.761)  
DIED x EG 0.008 * 0.007 * 0.007 * 
 (2.867) (2.761) (2.880)  
DDEI x EG 0.004 -0.001 0.002  
 (0.389) (-0.117) (0.240)  
DDED x EG 0.009 ** 0.008 *** 0.008 ** 
 (2.021) (1.656) (2.096)  
DIEI x MB 0.001 ** -0.000 0.000  
 (2.568) (-0.536) (1.059)  
DIED x MB 0.001 0.001 0.001 *** 
 (1.292) (0.775) (1.885)  
DDEI x MB 0.001 0.000 0.001  
 (1.260) (0.097) (0.570)  
DDED x MB -0.000 -0.001 -0.000  
 (-0.063) (-1.125) (-0.312)  
DIEI x PER -0.000 -0.000 * -0.000  
 (-0.009) (-2.783) (-1.006)  
DIED x PER -0.000 * -0.001 * -0.000 * 
 (-3.120) (-3.859) (-2.776)  
DDEI x PER -0.000 -0.001 -0.000  
 (-1.433) (-1.528) (-0.945)  
DDED x PER 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 (0.628) (0.127) (0.530)  
DIEI x DE -0.000 0.006 ** 0.002  
 (-0.090) (1.983) (0.653)  
DIED x DE 0.004 0.010 ** 0.006  
 (1.164) (2.499) (1.620)  
DDEI x DE -0.013 -0.004 -0.009  
 (-1.608) (-0.425) (-0.890)  
DDED x DE -0.014 *** -0.006 -0.011  
 (-1.927) (-0.848) (-1.377)  
N 2,889 2,889 2,889  
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.082 0.152  
Test F 1.36 *   
Hausman Test 5.43   
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 4 - Logistic regression of the negative (positive) reaction to dividend increase 
(decrease) announcements and firm specific variables 
This table reports the estimation of a logistic regression relating the negative reaction to dividend increase 
announcements (Panel A) and the positive reaction to dividend decrease announcements (Panel B) and 
firm specific variables. BHARIi,-1 to +1 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if BHARi,-1to+1 is negative 
and 0 otherwise; BHARDi,-1 to +1 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if BHARi,-1to+1 is positive and 0 
otherwise; FSi is the firm size, computed as the natural log of market value of common equity at the end 
of the year before the dividend change year; LPCDi is the natural logarithm of annual change in dividends 
divided by the share price in the announcement day +1; LEGi is the natural logarithm of average earnings 
growth rate based on the year prior to the dividend change year +1; LMBi is natural logarithm of market 
price per share at the dividend change announcement date by the book value per share at the end of the 
year before the dividend change year + 1; LDEi is the natural logarithm of book value of total debt 
divided by the total book value of equity at the end of the year prior to the dividend change announcement 
+ 1. We report the coefficient values and the p-values. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Dividend Increases 
tiiiii LDELPERLMBFSBHARI εββββββα +++++++=+− 654i3i211  to1, LEG  LPCD  
Portugal 
 Coefficient p-value  
Constant 3.506 0.067 *** 
Firm Size -0.123 0.263  
Log % Change of Dividends -5.301 0.230  
Log Earnings Growth -1.311 0.005 * 
Log Market to Book ratio -0.671 0.319  
Log Price/Earnings ratio -0.031 0.913  
Log Debt to Equity ratio -0.930 0.059 *** 
N 158   
Nagelkerke R2 0.169   
France 
 Coefficient p-value  
Constant -0.759 0.597  
Firm Size 0.049 0.596  
Log % Change of Dividends 4.809 0.721  
Log Earnings Growth -0.610 0.101  
Log Market to Book ratio -0.816 0.076 *** 
Log Price/Earnings ratio 0.220 0.422  
Log Debt to Equity ratio -0.249 0.523  
N 235   
Nagelkerke R2 0.035   
(Continue) 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 4 - Logistic regression of the negative (positive) reaction to dividend increase 
(decrease) announcements and firm specific variables (continued) 
Panel A: Dividend Increases 
tiiiii LDELPERLMBFSBHARI εββββββα +++++++=+− 654i3i211  to1, LEG  LPCD  
UK 
 Coefficient p-value  
Constant -1.601 0.000 * 
Firm Size 0.059 0.011 ** 
Log % Change of Dividends 0.594 0.944  
Log Earnings Growth 0.053 0.666  
Log Market to Book ratio 0.165 0.031 ** 
Log Price/Earnings ratio 0.010 0.918  
Log Debt to Equity ratio -0.326 0.015 ** 
N 2,623   
Nagelkerke R2 0.092   
 
Panel B: Dividend Decreases 
tiiiii LDELPERLMBFSBHARD εββββββα +++++++=+− 654i3i211  to1, LEG  LPCD  
Portugal 
 Coefficient p-value  
Constant -1.161 0.569  
Firm Size 0.106 0.398  
Log % Change of Dividends -0.078 0.973  
Log Earnings Growth -0.691 0.183  
Log Market to Book ratio -0.658 0.458  
Log Price/Earnings ratio -0.052 0.863  
Log Debt to Equity ratio -0.538 0.280  
N 121   
Nagelkerke R2 0.049   
France 
 Coefficient p-value  
Constant 1.235 0.647  
Firm Size 0.236 0.201  
Log % Change of Dividends 0.277 0.984  
Log Earnings Growth -0.573 0.341  
Log Market to Book ratio -1.405 0.118  
Log Price/Earnings ratio -1.128 0.022 ** 
Log Debt to Equity ratio -0.063 0.939  
N 62   
Nagelkerke R2 0.260   
(Continue) 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 4 - Logistic regression of the negative (positive) reaction to dividend increase 
(decrease) announcements and firm specific variables (continued) 
 
Panel B: Dividend Decreases 
tiiiii LDELPERLMBFSBHARD εββββββα +++++++=+− 654i3i211  to1, LEG  LPCD  
UK 
 Coefficient p-value  
Constant -0.963 0.401  
Firm Size 0.060 0.349  
Log % Change of Dividends 3.309 0.508  
Log Earnings Growth 0.246 0.418  
Log Market to Book ratio 0.155 0.543  
Log Price/Earnings ratio -0.012 0.960  
Log Debt to Equity ratio -0.164 0.706  
N 266   
Nagelkerke R2 0.130   
 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
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Table 5 - Selected specific variables for the sub-samples of events, according to the 
relationship between dividend change announcements and the BHAR 
This table reports the mean values of selected specific factors for the different groups classified according 
to the relation between dividend change announcements and the subsequent market reaction. FSi is the 
firm size for share i, computed as the natural log of market value of common equity at the end of the year 
before the dividend change year; PCDi is the percentage change of dividends for share i, computed as the 
annual change in dividends divided by the share price in the announcement day; EGi is the earnings 
growth rate for share i, computed as the average earnings growth rate based on the year prior to the 
dividend change year; MBi is the market to book ratio for share i, calculated by dividing the market price 
per share at the dividend change announcement date by the book value per share at the end of the year 
before the dividend change year; PERi is the price earning ratio for share i, computed as the price per 
share at the announcement date divided by the earnings per share at the end of the year before the 
dividend change year; DEi is the debt/equity ratio for share i, calculated as the book value of total debt 
divided by the total book value of equity at the end of the year prior to the dividend change 
announcement; PRDI identifies the events with a positive reaction to dividend increases; NRDD identifies 
the events with a negative reaction to dividend decreases; NRDI identifies the events with a negative 
reaction to dividend increases; PRDD identifies the events with a positive reaction to dividend decreases. 
In addition, the table also presents the value of the t-statistic to test for the differences between the means 
of two groups. 
 
    
Relation between dividend changes and BHAR 
Variables PRDI NRDI t - statistic NRDD PRDD 
 (I) (II) (I)-(II)  (III) (IV) 
t - statistic 
(III)-(IV) 
Portugal 
Firm size 17.118 16.762 1.574  17.019 17.122 -0.443 
% Change in dividends 0.082 0.026 1.023  -0.078 -0.075 0.726 
Earnings growth 0.892 0.292 3.253 * 0.116 -0.049 -0.72 
Market to book ratio 0.868 0.810 0.536  0.828 0.718 0.891 
Price/earnings ratio 9.548 10.296 -0.195  11.223 12.313 -0.132 
Debt/Equity ratio 1.015 0.659 2.668 * 1.044 0.781 1.013 
France 
Firm size 13.711 13.583 0.853  13.426 13.630 -0.392 
% Change in dividends 0.004 0.004 0.301  -0.009 -0.014 0.731 
Earnings growth 0.365 0.325 0.438  0.810 -0.040 1.708 ***
Market to book ratio 0.856 0.672 1.760 *** 1.209 0.638 2.116 ** 
Price/earnings ratio 22.972 22.696 0.462  25.939 15.806 3.006 * 
Debt/Equity ratio 0.999 0.978 0.092  1.160 1.297 -0.528 
UK 
Firm size 16.592 16.808 -5.097 * 16.198 16.436 -2.198 **
% Change in dividends 0.004 0.003 3.009 * -0.020 -0.021 5.831 *
Earnings growth 0.127 0.026 1.672 *** -0.382 0.242 -3.524 *
Market to book ratio 2.911 3.228 -3.141 * 2.302 2.260 0.997 
Price/earnings ratio 18.123 19.030 -6.604 * 18.880 18.559 0.614 
Debt/Equity ratio 0.495 0.465 0.120  0.606 0.555 0.478 
 
 
* Significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
** Significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
 
 
 
 
